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I. INTRODUCTION: FAA WEATHER INFORMATION
AND GENERAL AVIATION
X CCURATE WEATHER information is of critical impor-
nce to the general aviation pilot. Weather information
is frequently obtained by a pilot in various stages of flight
and flight preparation. First, the pilot will call a Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Service Station (FSS)
for a preflight weather briefing while still on the ground.
In the course of this briefing, the pilot is advised by an FSS
"Weather Briefer," or "Specialist," of current and antici-
pated weather along his proposed route of flight. In reli-
ance on this information, the pilot will determine what
route to take, possible diversions if weather intervenes, and
whether to undertake the flight at all. Depending on the
length of the flight, the conditions encountered, and the
habits of the pilot, additional weather information may be
obtained by radio while en route through either an FSS or
an air traffic control (ATC) facility. Weather information
may also be necessary in a more time-critical situation, such
as advice regarding specific weather conditions at a destina-
tion airport. If the weather is not as anticipated, on arrival
or approach for example, the pilot may be caught in a po-
tentially dangerous situation for which he is not prepared.
Unlike pilots of commercial aircraft and high-speed tur-
bine aircraft, the general aviation pilot is particularly at the
mercy of the elements, typically being unable to escape ad-
verse weather conditions by simply climbing above them.
The critical inquiry when a pilot comes to grief in a
weather-related accident after receiving faulty weather in-
formation is one of causation: was the faulty information a
proximate cause of the accident or did the pilot exercise
poor judgment when a sounder course of action would
have extricated him from the situation?
In the typical scenario, a pilot, in reliance on an FSS
weather briefing, undertakes a flight and encounters ad-
verse weather of which he has not been advised. He must
then decide whether to abort the flight, alter his course, or
press on as planned. If he crashes before escaping the ad-
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verse weather, the inevitable lawsuit will follow. This lawsuit
will (or at least should) examine the interrelationship be-
tween two fundamental concepts in aviation: (1) the pilot
in command's ultimate responsibility for the safe conduct
of his flight, and (2) the pilot's entitlement to accurate
weather information pertinent to the route of his flight.
Even in more time critical situations where the pilot re-
ceives the "latest" weather conditions from an ATC before
approaching or landing at an airport and detrimentally re-
lies on faulty information, the issue is essentially the same:
whether the faulty information or pilot error was the legal
cause of the accident. Although in the past it was often
held that the pilot was solely responsible for such accidents,
or contributorily negligent, modem theories of multiple
causation and comparative fault potentially sound the
death knell for such findings of exclusive causation.
This article will examine the liability of the government
for providing inadequate or inaccurate weather informa-
tion to pilots, and the line being drawn in causation be-
tween negligent services provided by the government and
negligence of the pilot for failing to avoid danger. Federal
courts have been reluctant to extend governmental liability
in aviation cases, where pilot error is often a contributing
factor to an accident. In the era of contributory negli-
gence, a finding of pilot error operated as a complete bar
to recovery by the pilot himself.' Additionally, a finding
that pilot error was the sole proximate cause or an interven-
ing, superseding cause of an accident typically precluded
recovery by all accident victims against all defendants other
than the negligent pilot.
Conversely, in these modern times of comparative fault
and multiple proximate causes, when some blame lies with
the government, only a finding that another's negligence
See, e.g., Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1323 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding
contributory fault an absolute defense under Indiana law); Insurance Co. of Pa. v.
United States, 590 F. Supp. 435, 444 (S.D. Miss. 1984) (applying Kentucky law); Pe-
ters v. United States, 596 F. Supp. 889, 895 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (applying Virginia law);
Swanson v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 654, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying New York
and Pennsylvania law).
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was the sole legal cause of the accident will forestall govern-
mental liability. Although federal courts continue to find
that pilot error was the "sole proximate cause" of weather-
related accidents (notwithstanding extreme negligence on
the part of the FAA), it is submitted that the liability of the
government for FSS and ATC negligence is likely to be an
increasing avenue of recovery for plaintiffs and for the ap-
portionment of liability among defendants. The extent of
the government's liability is of import to both the plaintiff
and defense bars. For the plaintiff, a solvent defendant is
added to the liability equation. On the other side of the
"v.," deep pocket co-defendants (typically insured manufac-
turers and aircraft operators) benefit by not being the only
defendants with sufficient resources to satisfy a hefty award.
II. THE AVENUE OF RECOVERY-THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) 2 and its waiver of sovereign immunity, the govern-
ment could not be held liable in tort for the negligence of
its employees.' The FTCA provides that the "government
of the United States shall be liable. . . in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
3 See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894); Langford v. United
States, 101 U.S. 341 (1879). Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity can be
traced to the English maxim, "the King can do no wrong," this common law rule has
no equivalent in American jurisprudence. Langford, 101 U.S. at 342-43. Rather,
American sovereign immunity was justified as "a policy imposed by necessity." Schil-
linger, 155 U.S. at 167.
Both Schillinger and Langord considered attempts to expand the liability of the
government under the Court of Claims Act-then the only avenue of judicial relief
against the federal government. In both instances the door to the courthouse was
held firmly closed to any suits against the government sounding other than in con-
tract. Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 167; Langford, 101 U.S. at 345; see Morgan v. United
States, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 531, 534-35 (1871) (denying recovery to owners of leased
vessel for negligence of government Quartermaster absent contractual basis); Gib-
bons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274-75 (1868) (refusing to extend liabil-
ity beyond express or implied contract); see generally 91 C.J.S. United States §§ 117, 176
(1955) (stating the United States must consent to be sued).
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judgment or for punitive damages."4 The United States dis-
trict courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims asserted
under the FTCA, where the action proceeds as a non-jury
trial.5
Under the FTCA, the form of the cause of action is deter-
mined by state substantive law. In the final analysis, cases
involving inaccurate weather information will often turn on
such fundamental common law tort concepts as proximate
cause, intervening and superseding cause, and contributory
negligence.
III. PILOT IN COMMAND AND FAULTY WEATHER
INFORMATION
There is perhaps no principle so well ingrained in avia-
tion as that of "pilot in command." The pilot in command
is the final authority regarding the safe conduct of a flight
and operation of the aircraft. The extent of this responsi-
bility is codified in the Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs).
Federal Aviation Regulation 91.3 provides in pertinent
part:
(a) [t]he pilot in command of an aircraft is directly respon-
sible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of
that aircraft[;] (b) [i]n an in-flight emergency requiring im-
mediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any
rule of this part to the extent required to meet that
emergency.6
As the preceding regulation clearly provides, the pilot in
command has significant discretion in an emergency situa-
tion-even to the extent of violating regulations and the
4 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988). The rule embodied by the FTCA with respect to gov-
ernmental torts is little more than a specific application of the common law rule of
respondeat superior. Section 219(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency states the
principle thus: "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants commit-
ted while acting in the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219(1) (1957).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
6 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1994).
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instructions of ATC personnel when, in his or her judg-
ment, the safe conduct of the flight so requires.7
The critical issue in cases where a pilot commences or
continues a flight into adverse weather conditions and
crashes is the reasonableness of the pilot's decision to un-
dertake or continue the flight under prevailing conditions.
The conduct of the pilot and his decisions will be viewed
under the strict scrutiny of the pilot in command con-
cept-the ultimate issue being whether this "directly re-
sponsible" individual exercised sound judgment in
planning, initiating, conducting, and continuing the flight.
Thus, even when relying on faulty weather information, a
pilot may still have a "last clear chance" of sorts to avoid the
accident, thereby absolving the government of liability. a
IV. PILOT AND FAA RESPONSIBILITIES-A
QUESTION OF CAUSATION
The complex interaction between the pilot and the FAA
regarding weather information gives rise to situations of
dual responsibility and, occasionally, dual culpability.
When inaccurate and incomplete weather information con-
tributes to an air crash, two potential causal factors must be
weighed: (1) the failure of FSS and/or ATC personnel to
provide accurate information, and (2) the pilot's subse-
quent opportunity to escape or avoid any peril occasioned
by the negligent governmental conduct.
7 A common example of such a "noncompliance" is refusing an ATC direction
that would require a pilot, operating under visual rules, to violate VFR weather mini-
mums (e.g., a direction that, if followed, would send the flight into clouds).
a "Last clear chance" is a common law doctrine pursuant to which a negligent
plaintiff may nonetheless recover, if the negligent defendant had the last opportu-
nity to prevent the plaintiff's subsequent harm, under circumstances where the
plaintiff could no longer reasonably avoid injury. This doctrine was primarily an
early way around the otherwise absolute bar of contributory negligence. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479, 480 (1963). In the context of the cases dis-
cussed herein, the government is rarely held to have had the "last clear chance" to
save the pilot; rather, courts often find the pilot should have avoided or escaped the
peril himself. But see Insurance Co. of Pa. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 435, 442
(S.D. Miss. 1984) (holding that FSS had "last clear chance" to prevent pilot encoun-
ter with adverse weather); see infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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Ingham v. Eastern Air Line? is an early expression of the
pilot's and government's dual responsibility for the safe op-
eration of aircraft, particularly during marginal weather in
an airport traffic pattern. Ingham involved a commercial
flight into New York's Idlewild Airport (now JFK) in foggy
conditions. On November 30, 1962, an Eastern DC-7 enter-
ing the New York area at approximately 9:00 p.m. was ad-
vised that Idlewild was experiencing substantial fog. The
flight crew was not informed, however, that runway visibility
had dropped from three-quarters of a mile to one-half mile.
Moreover, the fact that one weather observer at Idlewild
had reported visibility of one-quarter mile, below the one-
half mile minimum required for the DC-7's instrument
landing system (ILS) approach, also went unreported. The
airplane crashed while attempting a missed approach.
Twenty-one passengers and four flight crew perished, and
approximately thirty other passengers were injured. The
trial court found the flight crew partially at fault for failing
to maintain runway alignment and delaying the missed ap-
proach. Moreover, even when initiated, the missed ap-
proach was improperly executed.10
The Ingham court concluded that the accident was the
result of concurrent negligence on the part of the govern-
ment, for failing to advise the flight crew of the runway con-
ditions, and the airline, for its misaligned approach and
botched go-around. In holding the government partly lia-
ble, the Ingham court expressly recognized that the pilot of
an aircraft relies on the government to provide accurate in-
formation and that the failure to provide such information
may put the aircraft at risk."
The better reasoned decisions involving critical ex-
changes of weather information between the FAA and pi-
9 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
10 According to the DC-7 manual, the proper procedure for a missed approach
requires the application of full take-off power to all engines, establishing a positive
rate of climb and, lastly, retraction of the flaps and landing gear. Post-accident in-
vestigation revealed that none of the engines were operating at full power, yet the
gear had already been retracted. Id. at 231-32.
11 Id. at 235-36.
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lots have recognized the interdependence of these two
entities. Although the pilot in command bears the ultimate
responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight, "he must
know those facts which are material to the operation of his
plane." 12
The interrelation of faulty weather information and sub-
sequent decisions of the pilot in command was also at issue
in Somlo v. United States."3 Pilot Thomas G. Somlo under-
took a flight from Naples, Florida on January 2, 1963, in a
Cessna 310. His intended destination was Chicago's
O'Hare Airport. His aircraft crashed eight miles east of the
airport due to accumulated structural icing. Somlo and his
younger daughter survived the crash, but his wife, elder
daughter, mother-in-law, and another passenger perished.
Somlo obtained a full weather briefing prior to his depar-
ture and was advised that he could expect VFR14 conditions
along his entire route. After stopping at Chattanooga, Ten-
nessee for fuel and food, Somlo proceeded with his flight.
He then contacted Bowling Green FSS for en route weather
information. At that time, light aircraft "advisory Delta" was
in effect, which warned of icing and 1FR 15 conditions along
Somlo's proposed route. Somlo claimed that he never re-
ceived this information. FSS personnel disagreed and pro-
duced station records to support their position.1 6
12 Dyer v. United States, 551 F. Supp. 1266, 1276 (W.D. Mich. 1982) (citing Gill v.
United States, 229 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also Spaulding v. United
States, 455 F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir. 1972) (recognizing duty of FSS weather briefer to
provide accurate information to pilot); Springer v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 913,
935 (D.S.C. 1986) (holding that the scope of government duty to pilots is deter-
mined both by written procedures and induced pilot reliance), aff'd without op., 819
F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1987); Somlo v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 827, 837 (N.D. Ill.
1967), aff'd, 416 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (holding
that FSS has duty to supply latest accurate weather information).
IS 274 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1967), aff'd 416 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
14 "VFR" means operations under "Visual Flight Rules" per 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.151-
.159 (1994).
1 "IFR" means operations under "Instrument Flight Rules" per 14 C.F.R.
§§ 91.167-.193 (1994).
16 Somlo, 274 F. Supp. at 830-31.
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Somlo later contacted Lafayette, Indiana FSS, where he
was not warned of icing conditions, despite the continued
validity of advisory Delta and an amended forecast for freez-
ing rain. Evidently, he was supplied with information as to
the forecast IFR conditions because he filed an IFR flight
plan for the remainder of the flight. Although ultimately
holding that the crash was attributable to Somlo's contin-
ued flight into icing conditions,17 the court recognized the
concomitant duties of pilots and FSS personnel. Applying
the "good samaritan" rule of Indian Towing Co. v. United
States,'8 the court recognized that when the government un-
dertakes the performance of a duty, inducing reliance, it
has a duty to perform that duty non-negligently: "We think
that if Mr. Somlo was never supplied with the available
weather information which indicated icing conditions and
the probability thereof, that he would have a justifiable
grievance against the Government."' 9
Although Lafayette FSS breached its duty to Somlo by not
providing advisory Delta or a warning of the freezing pre-
cipitation, the court held that Somlo's negligence in not
requesting additional information and in pressing on with
the flight was the "major contributing proximate cause" of
the accident.2 0 Concluding that Somlo had received an ear-
lier warning of icing and had failed to make further inquir-
ies along his route, the court held that his failure to obtain
additional information caused the crash: "From what we
have indicated, we do not believe Mr. Somlo adequately ful-
filled his responsibilities as pilot in command of his craft."
2
'
Although there was some fault on the part of the FSS in
failing to provide the current weather information at Lafay-
17 The court also questioned Somlo's credibility, choosing to accept FSS's version
of a contested communication with Bowling Green FSS. The court accepted the
government's testimony that Somlo had been advised of forecast icing and dismissed
Somlo's testimony to the contrary. Id. at 838, 842.
,8 350 U.S. 61 (1955). This same doctrine was previously applied by the Second
Circuit in Ingham, 373 F.2d at 236.
'9 Som/o, 274 F. Supp. at 838.
Id. at 843.
21 Id. at 841.
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ette, a full review of the Somlo decision leaves one convinced
that Somlo was primarily responsible for his own misfor-
tunes. Moreover, he did not help his cause by misrepre-
senting to ATC that he was not carrying passengers (he was
not rated to carry passengers in the multi-engine Cessna
310 involved in the incident). This and other apparent mis-
representations unquestionably undermined Somlo's
credibility.
The district court decision in Black v. United States22 is an
early example of an apportionment of liability between a
general aviation pilot and FSS personnel. That court recog-
nized that pilot error and inadequate weather information
can combine and both proximately cause an accident.2 3 In
Black, the VFR pilot contacted Alexandria, Louisiana FSS
while en route from Baton Rouge, Louisiana to Fort Worth,
Texas on May 9, 1965. Black requested and received infor-
mation on winds aloft and the current altimeter setting.
However, contrary to the guidelines of the Flight Assistant
Service Handbook, the FSS Specialist did not inquire as to
Black's course and destination and, therefore, could not
supply appropriate information as to hazardous conditions
en route. Had he obtained this information, he would have
realized that "Sigmet Charlie 2"24 was pertinent to Black's
flight. 2 5 This Sigmet warned of thunderstorms, some of a
severe nature, near Black's course. Black later flew into a
thunderstorm and crashed. Black and his two passengers
were killed.
In the subsequent wrongful death action under the
FTCA, 2 6 the trial court found that the failure of FSS to in-
quire and supply Sigmet Charlie 2 was a proximate cause of
the accident.27 Although an accident of this type clearly
could not have occurred without negligently flying into the
303 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd, 441 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1971).
23 Id. at 1251-52.
24 The FAA uses "SIGMET" for "Significant Meteorological Information," mean-
ing an inflight advisory of weather that is hazardous to all aircraft.
25 Black, 303 F. Supp. at 1251.
26 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
27 Black, 303 F. Supp. at 1251-52.
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hazardous weather conditions, the court rejected the argu-
ment that pilot negligence was the sole cause of the acci-
dent. Applying Louisiana's law of proximate cause, the
court held that FSS negligence was a "substantial cause" of
the crash.2 8 "[T]he mere possibility that [the accident]
might have happened without the [FSS] negligence is not
sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect between
the negligence and the injury."29 However, due to Black's
contributory negligence, the government was held to have a
right of indemnity against Black's estate for its liability to
the estates of the other passengers.30 Accordingly, the ef-
fect of the apparently progressive ruling of the court de-
pended, as a practical matter, on the assets of Black to
satisfy the claims of his passengers. If Black was amply in-
sured or could otherwise satisfy the passengers' awards
against him, the judgment against the government was a
mere paper tiger, as the government's payout could, in the-
ory, be recovered back from Black or his insurer. However,
a finding of sole proximate causation and/or intervening
superseding cause, as espoused by the government, would
have had the more drastic effect of cutting off all avenues of
recovery other than Black himself. In reversing, the Fifth
Circuit held that Black's continued flight into the storm was
precisely such a superseding intervening cause, thereby cut-
ting off any avenue of relief against the government."1
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Middle District of Tennes-
see's absolution of the government in similar circumstances
in Pierce v. United States.12 Pilot Richard Pierce and his pas-
sengers were killed after his aircraft broke up in flight. The
plaintiff claimed that the aircraft broke up in severe turbu-
lence associated with a thunderstorm. The government ar-
gued that Pierce flew into instrument conditions and
28 Id. at 1252-53.
- Id. (quoting Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi Tank Co., 166 So. 2d 252, 256
(La. 1964)).
-o Id. at 1253.
" Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741, 745 (5th Cir. 1971).
679 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1982).
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overstressed the airframe while trying to recover from an
inadvertent spiral.3 3
The district court found that Pierce had planned a VFR
flight from New Castle, Indiana to Polk County, Georgia for
April 11, 1976, with five members of his family. During the
flight, Pierce contacted Indianapolis FSS on several occa-
sions and was repeatedly advised that VFR flight was not
recommended and that a cold front was passing through
the area. A possibility of thunderstorms was mentioned. In
the course of his last briefing at 3:06 p.m. on April 11,
Pierce was advised of improving conditions and, unlike his
prior briefings, was not advised that VFR was not recom-
mended. Pierce was not told of Sigmet Charlie 1, which
warned of possible embedded thunderstorms in chains or
clusters of increasing severity.34 Contemporaneous radar
reports confirmed the presence of rain and thunderstorms.
Pierce opened his VFR flight plan at 3:50 p.m. and was
never heard from again. Plaintiffs argued that placing the
pilot in a perilous situation where weather endangered the
flight constituted a proximate cause of the ensuing crash,
even if pilot error and disorientation contributed to the ac-
cident.3 5 The government maintained that pilot error was
the sole cause of the accident and nonetheless broke the
chain of causation from any breach of duty by the FSS. Un-
able to choose between the two conflicting theories of cau-
sation, the district court held that plaintiffs had not proved
that the failure to warn of the thunderstorms had caused
the crash.3 6
The Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had not made
sufficiently specific fact findings and conclusions of law on
proximate causation. 37 The district court should have de-
termined whether the failure to advise of the thunder-
storms constituted a breach of duty and, if so, whether the
ss Id. at 620.
54 Id.
-, Id. at 621.
36 Id.
17 Pierce, 679 F.2d at 621.
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breach was a proximate cause of the accident. The possibil-
ity of two proximate causes-pilot and FSS conduct-did
not preclude a finding of FAA negligence. Under the ap-
plicable law of Indiana, more than one course of conduct
could constitute proximate causes of an accident.38 Con-
tributory negligence might foreclose recovery by the pilot,
but would not be imputed to the passengers and bar recov-
ery from another negligent actor. Only a finding of "sole
proximate caus[ation]" on the part of Pierce could fore-
close recovery against the government for all aboard.3 9
V. ONE EXTREME-POOR PILOT JUDGMENT
One of the earlier cases to examine the relationship be-
tween a general aviation pilot and federal authorities was
Kullberg v. United States.'° In Kullberg, the estate of the de-
ceased pilot, Richard Kullberg, commenced an action
under the FTCA,41 alleging that the government had failed
to provide adequate weather information and vectoring
services, causing the decedent, a VFR-only pilot, to fly "inad-
vertently" into instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC).42 Plaintiff contended that the aircraft crashed due
to accumulated ice and further alleged numerous negligent
acts on the part of the government, including failure to pro-
vide gratuitous in-flight weather information, failure of
ATC personnel to provide information that Kullberg had
never requested, and inadequate radar vectoring into the
Greater Pittsburgh Airport.
The essential facts of the case, as found by the district
judge, were that Kullberg continued his flight in deteriorat-
ing conditions, failed to request weather advisories en
route, deliberately flew into IMC conditions, and attempted
to fly an instrument approach although he was not certifi-
Id. at 622 (citing Hartzler v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 433 F.2d 104, 108 (7th Cir.
1970) (applying Indiana law)).
- Id. at 623.
- 271 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
41 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
42 This type of accident is commonly referred to as "VFR into IMC."
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cated for instrument flight. After requesting and accepting
a radar guided approach calling for him to descend
through clouds in violation of VFR, Kullberg's plane appar-
ently broke up due to "heavy positive loads on the air-
craft."43 The court concluded that the probable cause of
this break-up was "a high speed spiral occasioned by the pi-
lot's loss of control" after Kullberg became disoriented in
the clouds.44
The court held that the government had not breached
any duty to Kullberg.45 Rather, Kullberg's repeated acts of
negligence had caused the crash.' Moreover, even if the
crash had been caused by icing, contrary to the court's find-
ings, Kullberg's contributory negligence barred any recov-
ery.4 7 Among Kullberg's negligent acts were: commencing
the flight into anticipated en route IFR conditions; failing
to advise ATC that he was not instrument rated; descending
into overcast; and failing to advise ATC of weather encoun-
tered in the course of the descent.4
Kullberg represents one extreme of pilot negligence, the
fault clearly lying exclusively with the pilot in command.
Examples of such pure pilot error and lack of judgment
abound. 49 In these cases there is little doubt where the pri-
mary fault lies, and one would be hard pressed to apportion
41 Kullberg, 271 F. Supp. at 796.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 798.
46 Id. at 797.
47 Id. at 799.
48 Kullberg, 271 F. Supp. at 796-97.
0 See, e.g., Barbosa v. United States, 811 F.2d 1444, 1448 (11th Cir. 1987) (contin-
ued flight into thunderstorms despite adverse weather advisories); Spaulding v.
United States, 455 F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir. 1972) (flight into forecasted IFR condi-
tions); Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741, 744-46 (5th Cir. 1971) (VFR flight with-
out weather briefing-penetrating storm for over 100 miles); Davis v. United States,
643 F. Supp. 67, 77-78 (N.D. 111. 1986) (VFR flight on rainy day into forecasted dete-
riorating weather), aff'd, 824 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1987); Lombard v. United States,
601 F. Supp. 10, 12 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (flight into forecasted IFR conditions), aff'd,
767 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1985); Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471, 483-86 (W.D.
Wash. 1975) (commercial flight into cloud-obscured terrain); DeVere v. True-Flite,
Inc., 268 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.C. 1967) (failure to obtain weather briefing-crash on
VFR flight into clouds).
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liability to the government for the failure of FAA personnel
to save the pilot from himself.
VI. THE OTHER EXTREME-EXCLUSIVE
GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
It is rare for the government to be held exclusively liable
for the crash of an aircraft in adverse weather. In most
cases, a period of time separates the negligence of the gov-
ernment from that of the pilot. The pilot is therefore typi-
cally afforded some window of opportunity to avoid or
escape the perilous weather situation. The size of this win-
dow and how well it is utilized by the pilot will determine
whether the pilot was contributorily negligent, compara-
tively negligent, or solely at fault. Thus, in order for gov-
ernment negligence to be the sole proximate cause of a
weather-related aviation accident, the government's con-
duct must place the aircraft in a situation from which it has
little or no chance of escape.
Martin v. United States"° presented just such an unusual
scenario. In Martin, two highly qualified IFR pilots were at
the controls of a twin Cessna 414 (Reg. No. N44JG, herein-
after "4JG") when it crashed on approach to Pine Bluff Air-
port, Arkansas in instrument flight conditions. Both of the
pilots and two passengers perished in the crash. The repre-
sentatives of the various estates settled with non-govern-
ment defendants and maintained an FTCA action against
the United States.
The flight departed New Orleans, Louisiana at 5:24 p.m.
on December 6, 1974 in instrument conditions. 4JG ob-
tained a weather briefing before departure, and minimal
IFR conditions were forecast throughout Arkansas. Pine
Bluff was a controlled airport, but lacked an instrument
landing system for precision approaches. 51 Prior to at-
tempting the approach, Pine Bluff ATC supplied 4JG with
an altimeter setting of 29.80 inches of mercury. In fact, the
50 448 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1977), aff'd inpart, rev'd in part, 586 F.2d 1206 (8th
Cir. 1978).
51 Id. at 862.
1995] 975
976 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
proper setting was 29.90 inches, causing the altimeter to
read 100 feet higher than the actual altitude. At the time it
supplied the altimeter setting, Pine Bluff controllers knew
that a special weather observation was due out shortly and
that this amended report would reflect deteriorating condi-
tions at Pine Bluff.52  4JG's last-received weather informa-
tion advised of 300 foot ceilings and one mile visibility in
drizzle and fog.53 By 7:23 p.m. this weather observation had
been revised to indicate that the ceiling had dropped to
zero and the sky was obscured. Nonetheless, Pine Bluff
ATC failed to advise 4JG of the deteriorating condition in
the course of an additional radio communication at 7:25
p.m. When Pine Bluff controllers attempted to advise 4JG
of the change in field conditions at 7:26:23, 4JG did not
respond. By that time, 4JG had either crashed or was be-
yond recovery.
The court concluded that 4JG descended below the pub-
lished minimum descent altitude (MDA) 54 because of the
incorrect altimeter setting, not due to any error on the part
of the now deceased pilots, who were presumed to have
complied with regulations. 55 Accordingly, the pilots were
presumed to have been in visual contact with the runway
when they continued the descent below what they thought
to have been MDA. Upon identifying appropriate runway
markings, the pilot in command would have been in the
process of transitioning from flight by instruments to flight
by visual reference. During this critical period, the pilot
was under the mistaken belief that he had 100 feet more
altitude than actually available. This mistaken belief, in
combination with the fog-enshrouded trees below and ob-
52 At approximately 7:16 p.m. Pine Bluff controllers advised Little Rock ATC that
worsening weather conditions would soon be reported. Pine Bluff communicated
the altimeter setting to 4JG at 7:21 p.m. Id. at 867.
5s Id. at 868.
54 FAR 91.175 sets forth the MDA requirements. Descent below the published
MDA on approach is prohibited unless the pilot is in visual contact with the runway
or specified runway markings, including the runway end identifier lights. 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.175 (1994) (equivalent to 14 C.F.R. § 91.117 in Martin time frame).
55 Martin, 448 F. Supp. at 870.
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scured sky above, was held to have led to spatial disorienta-
tion and, ultimately, the loss of control and crash.5 6
The court concluded that 4JG would have abandoned the
instrument approach well before the accident, had the de-
teriorating weather conditions been timely reported.57 The
inaccurate altimeter setting exacerbated the danger. Most
significantly, the court rejected entirely the government's
argument that the pilots of 4JG had contributed to the acci-
dent.58 The court noted that the pilot in command's pri-
mary responsibility was for the safe conduct of the flight,59
but held that the experienced pilot(s) had justifiably relied
on the information provided by the controllers.6 ° Under
the applicable law of Arkansas, contributory fault need not
constitute a complete bar to recovery. 61 The finding of no
pilot negligence was facilitated by the lack of definitive
proof as to which of the two pilots was actually operating
the aircraft at the time of the crash. Unable to determine
which occupant should pay the penalty for contributory
negligence, if any, the court refused to speculate and held
the government exclusively liable.62
In an unusual reversal of their roles in proximate causa-
tion, subsequent acts of the government were held to have
superseded earlier pilot negligence in Insurance Co. of Penn-
sylvania v. United States.63 In this case, commercial pilot
Gary Norman Ryan obtained a weather briefing at approxi-
mately 5:00 p.m. on October 27, 1977. Ryan intended to
make a cargo run in a Cessna 402A twin engine aircraft
from Jackson to Tupelo, Mississippi and continue on to Ev-
ansville, Indiana and Detroit, Michigan.
56 Id. at 870-71.
57 Id. at 871.
58 Id. at 872.
5 Id. at 865.
Martin, 448 F. Supp. at 870-71; see generaly Indian Towing v. United States, 350
U.S. 61 (1955) (government undertaking to perform a duty has duty to perform that
duty non-negligently).
6, Martin, 448 F. Supp. at 871.
62 Id. at 872.
65 590 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Miss. 1984).
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VFR conditions were forecast for Ryan's route until ap-
proximately two hours after his scheduled arrival in Evans-
ville. Ryan completed the flight to Tupelo in VFR
conditions without incident. While en route to Tupelo,
Ryan filed an IFR flight plan for his flight from Tupelo to
Evansville. Although he was required to obtain weather in-
formation when filing this flight plan, Ryan neglected to do
so. 64 Ryan did, however, obtain weather information from
Memphis Center while en route to Evansville and was ad-
vised that the Evansville Airport was fogged in with one-
eighth mile visibility, below the minimum required for an
instrument approach. Despite advisories from Paducah,
Kentucky FSS that conditions at Evansville continued to de-
teriorate, Ryan continued on course to Evansville. At 8:47
p.m., Ryan contacted Terre Haute FSS and spoke to Spe-
cialistJames Freeman. Freeman failed to supply Airmet "Al-
pha One" that warned of deteriorating conditions at
Evansville as well as Owensboro, a possible alternate airport.
Between 9:10 and 9:22 p.m., Ryan missed two approaches
due to low visibility at the Evansville Airport.
Ryan, who was quite familiar with the area, contacted
nearby Henderson Airport at 9:30 p.m. and was advised by
Mrs. Jo Davis, the unicom operator, that the field was
fogged in. At that time, Ryan informed ATC that he had
approximately forty minutes of fuel remaining in his tanks.
Specialist Freeman, knowing Ryan's fuel condition, diverted
him to the airport in Bowling Green, Kentucky. Unbe-
knownst to Ryan and Freeman,Jo Davis continued to moni-
tor Ryan's radio transmissions from the Henderson Airport.
By 9:37 p.m., conditions at Henderson had cleared. Davis
contacted Freeman and advised him of the improvement at
Henderson. Freeman never relayed this information to
Ryan, despite the fact that Ryan was only minutes away from
a safe landing at the Henderson field at the time (9:41
p.m.). Freeman also failed to advise Ryan of clear condi-
tions in nearby Paducah, Kentucky. During this time pe-
Id. at 437.
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riod, Ryan had over forty minutes of fuel remaining, as he
ultimately crash landed at 10:24 p.m. with both tanks dry.
Ryan survived the crash and commenced an action against
the government for Freeman's failure to advise him of the
deteriorating conditions at Evansville and to route him to a
closer airport.
The district court found that both Ryan and Freeman
had been negligent.65 Freeman, however, had the "last
clear chance" to extricate Ryan from his predicament
under Kentucky law.6 Thus, in this unusual case of role
reversal, Ryan's previous negligence was cut off by the later
negligence of FSS, which was held to have ultimately placed
Ryan in a situation from which he could not recover.6 7
VII. MOORHEAD-THE MANUFACTURER, TOO
In an unusual variation on the roles of pilot and govern-
ment, a design flaw was held to be the proximate cause of
an accident that followed on the heels of a questionable
weather briefing. In Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft,6 pilot
R.D. Baker and four passengers perished when their air-
craft went down after an icing encounter. In the course of
the preflight briefing, Baker was advised of clouds, thunder-
storms, and precipitation. Icing was not mentioned. The
National Weather Service had, however, forecast icing
along Baker's route between Dallas, Texas and Augusta,
Georgia.
65 Id. at 444.
Freeman's negligence included his failure to advise of the conditions at Padu-
cah and his failure to pass on the information from Mrs.Jo Davis regarding the clear
conditions at Henderson Airport. Id. at 442-44. Ryan's acts of negligence consisted
of violating the FARs by attempting an instrument approach in below minimum
conditions, continuing his course into Evansville despite poor conditions, not hav-
ing required approach charts aboard the aircraft, and inadequate fuel preservation
technique. Id. at 444. Interestingly, although Ryan's poor fuel management pre-
ceded or was concurrent with the negligence of Freeman, it apparently did not
amount to a "clear [enough] chance" to save himself. Insurance Co. of Pa., 590 F.
Supp. at 444.
67 Id.
828 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1987).
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After a 4:13 p.m. departure, the aircraft climbed nor-
mally to its cruising altitude of 21,000 feet. Icing was en-
countered shortly thereafter, and the aircraft had begun to
lose velocity by 4:46 p.m. By 4:51 p.m., the Mitsubishi MU-
2B-25 reached its highest altitude of 21,400 feet and slowed
from its initial cruise velocity of 198 knots to 125 knots.
The plane began to descend rapidly and disappeared from
the radar controller's scopes by 4:52 p.m.
As is typically the case in fatal general aviation accidents,
there was little direct evidence as to the cause of the crash.
Evidence was primarily drawn from expert accident recon-
struction. The district court found that the FAA had not
been negligent under the applicable law of Texas and held
that the U.S. Government had breached no duty to Baker
and his passengers by failing to advise of the forecast ic-
ing.69 The district court held, as a matter of fact, that the
weather briefing satisfied the requisite level of due care
notwithstanding the omission of the icing information.7 °
This fact finding was reviewed by the Fifth Circuit under
the clearly erroneous standard of review.71
The circuit court's affirmance on this issue demonstrates
the high duty of care required of the pilot in command,
who is charged not only with obtaining adequate weather
information but also with understanding the full implica-
tions of the information received. Specifically, the court
held that Baker, a certificated instrument pilot, should have
understood that the presence of thunderstorms and precip-
itation above the freezing level of the atmosphere implied a
strong possibility of structural icing.72
Although upholding the district court's findings on
breach of duty, the Fifth Circuit added that any breach of
duty by the FAA, even if did take place, was not a proximate
cause of the crash as it was not likely to have affected the
- Id. at 281.
70 Id. at 282.
7' Id.
72 Id. at 285.
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pilot's conduct and decision to undertake the flight.73
Rather, the proximate causes consisted of the inadequate
design of the aircraft's Pitot static system and the conduct
of Baker.74 The Pitot static system was adjudged defective
because it had a tendency to exaggerate airspeed in icing
conditions, thus causing the pilot to believe he was flying at
a higher, hence safer, airspeed than his actual airspeed.7 5
The district court found Baker negligent for: (1) entering
the clouds responsible for the icing; (2) prolonging his en-
counter with the icing conditions; and (3) losing control of
the aircraft.76
The Fifth Circuit affirmed as to all but the first-listed in-
stance of pilot negligence.77 Entering moderate icing in an
aircraft equipped for such conditions was not per se unrea-
sonable. 78 Having reversed this one finding of negligence,
the case was remanded to the district court for a reappor-
tionment of fault between Baker and Mitsubishi.79
VIII. SUPERSEDING CAUSE?
Notwithstanding the application of a "progressive" pure
comparative fault statute, the Eight Circuit recently upheld
a finding of "sole proximate" cause, absolving the govern-
ment from liability to both pilot and passengers. After a
seemingly interminable litigation, a helicopter pilot was
held solely responsible for his death and the death of the
two nurses accompanying him when his aircraft flew into
terrain while encountering forecast, but unreported, re-
,- Moorhead, 828 F.2d at 283.
74 Id. at 284-85.
75 Id. at 284. The Pitot static system measures the differential between ram air,
forced into the Pitot tube as the aircraft moves forward through the air, and static,
or undisturbed atmospheric pressure. The defect alleged in Moorhead evidently
caused a false increase in this differential in icing, causing a higher indicated air-
speed. See genera//y VAN SICKLE'S, MODERN AIRMANSHIP 207-08 (John F. Welch ed.,
6th ed. 1990); FAA FLIGHT TRAINING HANDBOOK 26 AC 61-21A (explaining Pitot
static system).
76 Moorhead, 828 F.2d at 285.
7 Id. at 282.
78 Id. at 285.
79 The district court had found Baker and Mitsubishi liable 60% and 40% for the
accident, respectively. Moorhead, 828 F.2d at 281.
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duced visibility. Moreover, the government was absolved
from liability despite the court's specific finding that the
weather briefer had failed to supply pertinent weather in-
formation that, if supplied, would have prevented the pilot
from undertaking the flight. As a result, the FBO and its
insurer bore the brunt of this loss, and neither the plaintiff
nor any of the co-defendants had any recourse against the
government for clear breaches of duty.
The essential factual findings of the case are set forth in
the decision of the trial court in Budden v. United States.8 0
On the afternoon of December 20, 1985, Craig Budden, a
pilot and employee of Rodgers Helicopter Service, was as-
signed to fly a medevac flight from Kearney, Nebraska to
Ainsworth, Nebraska. He obtained an abbreviated weather
briefing at 5:52 p.m. from the Omaha Flight Service Sta-
tion. Budden requested weather reports from Broken Bow
and Ainsworth, Nebraska, as well as whether they were "ex-
pecting any significant weather moving through that area in
the next hour and a half."8l He was advised that he could
expect no worse than occasional ceilings of 1200 feet and
visibility as low as three miles until 4:00 a.m. local time. 2
There was no dispute that the briefer provided adequate
information with respect to the reported weather at Ains-
worth and Broken Bow. However, the adequacy of the in-
formation relating to "significant weather moving through
the area" was hotly contested. The briefer did not consult
the applicable Chicago Area Forecast (FA), relying instead
on the more localized Transcribed Weather Broadcasts
(TWEBs) and Terminal Area Forecasts.8 3 The Chicago FA
80 748 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Neb. 1990) (Budden 1), vacated, 963 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1992).
el Id. at 1381.
e2 Id. at 1382.
83 An "Area Forecast" describes current and forecast weather over an area the size
of several states. The Chicago FA covers 12 states in the North Central United
States, including Nebraska. "Terminal Forecasts" report weather within a 25 nauti-
cal mile radius of a specific airport, while "TWEBs" contain data pertinent to specific
routes of flight. See generally TERRY T. LANFoRD, THE PILOT'S GUIDE TO WEATHER
REPORTS, FoRECASTS & FLIGHT PLANNING 71-132 (1990) (in-depth discussion of scope
and purpose of foregoing).
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advised of potential icing and the possibility of ceilings be-
low 1000 feet. The information relayed to Budden made
no mention of either icing or ceilings below 1000 feet prior
to 4:00 a.m.
Under the applicable FAA regulations, night helicopter
flights with ceilings below 1000 feet and visibility of less
than three miles were prohibited."4 Moreover, Rodgers He-
licopter's internal regulations, expressly incorporated into
the FARs, prohibited operations under visual flight rules
with ceilings of less than 1000 feet and visibility of less than
three miles.85 Budden, although a certified IFR pilot, in-
tended to make the flight VFR, and could not do otherwise,
as Rodgers' Bell 206L was not certified for instrument
flight.
On the basis of the weather briefing received, Budden
departed Kearney at 6:01 p.m. under visual flight rules in
VFR conditions. He crashed approximately twenty miles
short of Ainsworth, just before 7:00 p.m. Budden and the
two nurses accompanying him were killed. Although sev-
eral persons had seen the aircraft as it neared the crash site,
there were no witnesses to the actual impact.
Rodgers' and Budden's insurer (Budden was an addi-
tional insured on Rodgers' policy) settled the claims of the
estates of the deceased nurses. Thereafter, Rodgers Heli-
copter, Budden's estate, Rodgers' liability insurer, and Rod-
gers' workers' compensation carrier commenced an FTCA
action against the United States for the alleged negligence
of the weather briefer. The Budden I court found that the
briefer had breached its duty to Budden by failing to advise
him of the potential icing conditions in the Ainsworth and
Broken Bow area, stating:
[The briefer's] failure to inform Budden of the forecast of
rime icing undoubtedly contributed to Budden's decision to
commence the flight, because N 1OLG was not certified to
14 Budden v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 1444, 1445 (D. Neb. 1992) (Budden II1),
aff'd, 15 F.3d 1444 (8th Cir. 1994). This minimum has since been amended to 1200
feet. See 14 C.F.R. § 135.205(6)(2) (1989).
15 Budden II, 808 F. Supp. at 1455.
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fly in any icing conditions. Federal Aviation Regulation
§ 135.227(b)(2) prohibits take-off under VFR conditions
into known light or moderate icing condition "unless the
aircraft has functional deicing or anti-icing equipment
"86
However, despite its findings that the briefer had
breached his duty and that Budden presumably would not
have departed if advised of the icing, the trial court held
that the government was not liable because this particular
negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident.8 7
Piecing together the various expert and lay testimony in the
case, the court concluded that the crash had not been
caused by icing.88 Rather, testimony suggested that Budden
had flown into a "scud" cloud and attempted to descend
below it. Due to an inaccurate altimeter setting, Budden
believed his altitude to be approximately sixty feet greater
than the aircraft's actual altitude. The court concluded, "it
was the pilot's continued flight into deteriorating weather
conditions consisting of decreasing cloud ceilings and visi-
bility, not icing, that caused this accident."89
The decision of the trial court gave rise to the first ap-
peal, Budden 1190 The Budden I plaintiffs alleged on appeal
that the district court had failed to address the briefer's fail-
ure to advise of possible ceilings below 1000 feet in the
Ainsworth and Broken Bow vicinities, as indicated by the
Chicago FA. The Eighth Circuit remanded the case back to
the district court for a determination of whether the failure
to warn of the ceilings below 1000 feet had proximately
caused the accident.91
In the next manifestation of this dispute, Budden 111,92 the
district court concluded that despite the briefer's failure to
advise of the low ceilings, the accident was solely Budden's
86 Budden , 748 F. Supp. at 1384.
87 Id. at 1385.
88 Id. at 1389.
- Id. at 1398.
-0 963 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1992).
91 Id. at 194.
92 808 F. Supp. 1444 (D. Neb. 1992).
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fault for pressing on with the flight.93 . In a terse, one-page
opinion, Senior District Judge Urbom held that a "reason-
able person" would have turned around or attempted to
land.94 The Eighth Circuit would later interpret this to
mean that Budden's decision to continue the flight into the
bad weather constituted an intervening act of negligence. 95
The legal effect of this intervening cause was to cut off any
causal link from the briefer's negligence and impose liabil-
ity solely on the pilot for his decision to continue the
flight.96 The Budden IV court affirmed the trial court's de-
termination that Budden bore sole responsibility for the ac-
cident.97 This decision prevented both Budden's estate and
the insurers from collecting any monies from the United
States for the negligence of the briefer.
The circuit court in Budden IV reviewed the district
court's determination of causation as a "finding of fact"
under Nebraska law, which was subject to reversal only if
"clearly erroneous."98 Under this standard, the Eighth Cir-
cuit could only reverse the trial court if it was "left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted."9 9 This standard of review would prove to be an in-
surmountable obstacle to a successful appeal.
Constrained by this standard of review, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that
"[a]lthough the unique facts of this case make for a close
call on proximate cause, the district court did not clearly
err."100 In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit focused
not on Budden's decision to initiate the flight, but on his
decision to continue into worsening conditions after he was
airborne.' In rendering its holding, the court stated:
- Id. at 1445.
o4Id.
95 Budden v. United States, 8 F.3d 1278 (8th Cir. 1993) (Budden IV), amended and
superseded by 15 F.3d 1444 (8th Cir. 1994).
- Id. at 1283.
97 Id.
9 Id. at 1282.
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
lo Budden V, 8 F.3d at 1283.
to, Id. at 1284.
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[T] he district court made a close call on circumstantial evi-
dence about the pilot's conduct in relation to the adverse
weather which he confronted. The evidence presented by
its very nature gives rise to varying conclusions. While an-
other fact-finder might have reached different conclusions
on proximate cause and the pilot's negligence, we cannot
say that the district court's ultimate finding that the pilot's
negligence solely caused the tragic air crash is clearly
erroneous. 
102
In a well-reasoned dissent, Senior Judge Lay advocated
just such a "different" conclusion, and reversal. 10 3 He dis-
agreed with his Eighth Circuit colleagues' refusal to con-
sider the effect of the weather briefing on the pilot's
decision to undertake the flight. According to the dissent,
"[i]t is the very possibility that a pilot will respond inade-
quately, or even negligently, that makes a crash the foresee-
able result of an inadequate weather forecast."0 4 The
dissent pointed to a line of Nebraska cases holding that if
the negligence of another (i.e., Budden's continued flight)
was foreseeable to the first negligent actor (i.e., the weather
briefer), the first actor remains liable. In sum, Judge Lay
reasoned that continued flight into worsening conditions is
precisely the type of hazard rendered likely by an inaccu-
rate weather briefing. 1 5
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Judge Lay wrote
that the effect of the affirmance was to completely exoner-
ate a negligent party from liability in a state that recognizes
comparative negligence.16 The Nebraska Comparative
Negligence Statute 0 7 was not considered by the trial court
and was not applied to weigh the relative negligence of the
parties. Absent the finding of an intervening cause, the
statute would have required the government to share the
"0 Id. at 1284-85.
- Id. at 1285 (Lay' J., dissenting).
-o Id. at 1286.
105 Budden IV, 8 F.3d at 1287.
106 Id. at 1288.
107 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21, 185 (1994).
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liability with Budden's and Rodgers' insurer. 1 8 Although
Budden, as pilot in command, bore the ultimate responsi-
bility for the safe conduct of his flight, he was denied the
very information that would have been critical to his go or
no-go decision.10 9
In this author's view, the fair result would have been the
apportionment of some liability against the government. It
is well ingrained in Nebraska case law that the test for inter-
vening cause is whether the subsequent act (Budden's deci-
sion to fly into worsening conditions) was foreseeable to the
first negligent party (the briefer). As recently as 1989, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska held: "The doctrine that an in-
tervening act cuts off a tort-feasor's liability comes into play
only when the intervening cause is not foreseeable."' 10
Conversely, it would seem that a finding of superseding
cause is not sustainable unless the later actor's negligence
was unforeseeable. The district court in Budden I and Bud-
den III made no such finding. Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
ine that continuing flight into adverse weather could have
been anything other than the foreseeable result of the inad-
equate briefing."'
A finding of intervening and superseding cause was simi-
larly upheld in Tinkler v. United States. I" In Tinkler, on April
25, 1985, FSS personnel refused to provide weather infor-
mation to the pilot because this information had been put
away and the station was about to close for the evening.
The pilot was advised to contact another FSS for weather
information, which he never did. The aircraft crashed in a
typical "VFR-in-IMC" scenario after encountering low fog
108 Id.
log The final incarnation of this litigation, Budden v. United States, 15 F.3d 1444
(8th Cir. 1994), denied a petition for rehearing and modified Budden IV, clarifying
its earlier affirmance that Budden's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the
crash. Id. at 1445-46.
110 Looney v. Pickering, 439 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Neb. 1989) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
iMl Accident statistics indicate that weather was the main factor in 40% of all gen-
eral aviation accidents in the United States. DAVID THURSTON, DESIGN FOR SAFETr
167 (2d ed. 1995).
112 982 F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1992).
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and clouds. Although concluding that FSS had been negli-
gent by not providing the information readily available by
computer, the district court held that the pilot's failure to
obtain follow-up information and the continued flight into
IMC were superseding causes of the accident.'1 3 Again,
notwithstanding the negligence of the government, the
finding of sole proximate cause was upheld by the circuit
court, reviewing under the "clearly erroneous" standard."1 4
IX. WEBB AND WORTHINGTON-A BALANCED
APPROACH?
FTCA liability for the acts and omissions of FSS and ATC
personnel was recently examined in Webb v. United States"1 5
and Worthington v. United States.'16 Webb involved a series of
miscommunications and omissions on the part of the pilot
in command, FSS, and ATC personnel, all of whom argua-
bly bore some causal relationship to the crash of a Piper
Archer on February 5, 1988. Neither the pilot nor his two
passengers survived. Worthington involved inaccurate on-
field weather information relayed to a pilot on instrument
approach.
In Webb, pilot Allen Charlesworth, a low-time VFR pilot,
planned a flight from Salt Lake Airport, Utah to Roswell
Airport, New Mexico. He first contacted the Cedar City,
Utah FSS on the evening of February 4, 1988, for an out-
look briefing. FSS Specialist J. Walstad advised Charles-
worth of the potential for low visibility at the intended 5:30
a.m. departure the next day and suggested that he post-
pone his departure. He did not provide the terminal fore-
cast for Roswell, Charlesworth's destination.
Charlesworth's next contact with FSS came at 4:30 a.m.
on the day of the intended flight. Again he spoke to Wal-
stad. At the time of the call, the FSS computer system was
11S Tinkler v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 1067, 1074 (D. Kan. 1988), aff'd, 982
F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1992).
114 Tinkler, 982 F.2d at 1469.
,,5 840 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Utah 1994).
,,e 21 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1994).
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"down," and the full information needed for a standard
briefing was not available. Charlesworth was advised that
the information he had received was neither current nor
complete.
The limited information available to Walstad indicated
that the weather en route would not be ideal for a cross-
country VFR flight, but would improve later in the day.
Walstad was unable to relay the current conditions at Ros-
well, which were well below VFR minimums. Walstad ac-
cepted Charlesworth's VFR flight plan for filing, but failed
to note the limited nature of the briefing on the form.
Thus, incoming FSS Specialists reviewing the flight plan
could not know that Charlesworth had received less than a
full weather briefing. Compounding the error, the replace-
ment FSS personnel at the end of the shift had not been
advised that the computer system had been down, nor was a
notation to that effect made in the station's record of oper-
ations. Had either of these precautions been taken, later
shifts presumably would have been aware of the system's
problems and could have anticipated that incomplete brief-
ings had been given during the down time.
Charlesworth initiated a third preflight contact with FSS
at 7:30 a.m. on the date of accident. He spoke to Specialist
B. Poulson at the Cedar City FSS. Charlesworth did not re-
quest a complete standard briefing, and Poulson did not
ask if he required one. Poulson had no way of knowing of
the limited briefing previously given and supplied only the
information he considered necessary to supplement what
he assumed had been a full standard briefing. Poulson
failed to advise Charlesworth of the severity of the current
conditions at Roswell, which had been reported as sky to-
tally obscured by snow, clouds, and fog with a visibility of
one-half mile-well below the VFR minimum of a 1000 foot
ceiling and three miles visibility. 11
7
Charlesworth departed Salt Lake at approximately 8:30
a.m. under IMC conditions, presumably obtaining a special
117 14 C.F.R. § 91.155 (1994).
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VFR clearance,"" and contacted Cedar City FSS by radio at
approximately 8:41 a.m. to open his VFR flight plan.
Charlesworth did not ask Specialist McKay at Cedar City
FSS, with whom he had opened the flight plan, for addi-
tional weather information. McKay had no way of knowing
that Charlesworth lacked full and accurate weather infor-
mation at that time. Unbeknownst to Charlesworth and
McKay, the Roswell Airport had been closed for over three
hours due to one-quarter mile visibility and a totally snow-
obscured ceiling. Charlesworth landed in Albuquerque,
New Mexico at approximately 1:00 p.m., where he was
delayed in order to repair a malfunctioning speaker in the
aircraft's radio.
At 2:31 p.m., shortly after departing Albuquerque,
Charlesworth contacted Roswell FSS, spoke to Specialist B.
Byrom, and requested the current Roswell weather. The
field was VFR, but variable. The routine radio contact initi-
ated by Charlesworth required Byrom to supply weather ad-
visories within 150 miles of the flight. Byrom failed to
supply NOTAMS 119 as to the accumulated snow at Roswell,
or to advise Charlesworth that VFR was not recommended,
which would have been warranted under the prevailing
weather conditions.
Charlesworth contacted the Roswell control tower and
was immediately advised that the field was IFR. After some
missed communications between pilot and tower, Charles-
worth was asked to restate his intentions. Charlesworth, ap-
parently abandoning any thoughts of diverting to another
airport, requested a special VFR clearance into Roswell. At
2:52 p.m., controller Brown at Roswell gave Charlesworth
the airport NOTAMS, including information as to snow ac-
cumulation and the condition of the runways. The district
court found that both the pilot and the controllers should
have known that there was a danger of a whiteout, a condi-
I' When obtained from the authorized ATC facility, a special VFR clearance al-
lows a pilot to fly in controlled airspace in less than VFR conditions when he can
remain clear of clouds. Id. at § 91.157.
119 This is a notice given to airmen.
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tion where visual reference to the horizon is lost, which can
lead to spatial disorientation. 120
Charlesworth communicated intermittently with the
tower from this initial contact at 2:48 p.m. When the tower
attempted further contact at 3:03 p.m., there was no re-
sponse. Witnesses on the ground reported seeing the air-
craft fly toward the airport at 300 feet AGL, below an
overcast. At some point before entering the airport's con-
trol zone, 12 1 Charlesworth attempted a 180-degree turn,
mis-executed the maneuver, and crashed. The court con-
cluded that Charlesworth had experienced whiteout, lost
visual references, and crashed while attempting a steep
bank to extricate himself from the situation.122
Under the applicable laws of New Mexico, in order to
recover against the government, the representatives of the
decedents had to prove that the various FAA personnel had
breached a duty of care to the pilot and that this breach was
a proximate cause of the accident. Addressing the issue of
duty of care, DistrictJudge Greene properly noted that the
pilot and the FAA bear concurrent duties for the safe oper-
ation of the aircraft.12 3 Thus, negligence on the part of the
FAA would not preclude a finding of negligence on the
part of the pilot and vice versa.
The court found that Charlesworth was negligent in fail-
ing to obtain adequate pre-flight and in-flight weather in-
formation. 124  When he departed Salt Lake Airport,
Charlesworth knew or should have known that he had not
received adequate weather information, and he should
have obtained a full briefing when he spoke to Cedar City
FSS. Charlesworth also failed to obtain a full briefing via
radio when opening his flight plan.' 25 Cedar City FSS was
12 FAA Advisory Circular 60-4A (Feb. 9, 1983).
"2 Now referred to as class "D" airspace, a control zone is an area usually ex-
tending five miles from a controlled airport to an altitude of 2500 feet AGL. AIR-
MAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 3-22, 3-26 (1993).
- Webb, 840 F. Supp. at 1507.
- Id. at 1511.
124 Id. at 1512.
125 Id. at 1513.
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negligent in failing to obtain sufficient background infor-
mation from Charlesworth to provide an adequate weather
update. 126
The court carefully examined the pilot's responsibilities
with respect to avoiding adverse conditions and complying
with visual flight rules. Based upon the information sup-
plied, the court held that Charlesworth should have known
that he was approaching a hazardous situation in Ros-
well.127 The FAA Flight Training Handbook provides that
"minima are 'absolute minimum requirements and are not
recommended for pilots having limited experience.' "128
The court concluded that attempting a special VFR ap-
proach, under the conditions known to Charlesworth, was
not reasonable.12
In addition, the court held that the scope of FSS and
ATC duties to pilots was defined not only by official duty
manuals and regulations, but by pilot reliance as well.13 0
However, both FSS Specialists and Air Traffic Controllers
are entitled to assume that a pilot knows and will abide by
Federal Aviation Regulations and are not required to antici-
pate a pilot's negligence or to supply pilots with gratuitous
opinions as to how they should conduct their flight.1 31
Although the primary duty of controllers is the safe sepa-
ration of aircraft, the court held that a controller's secon-
dary duties require him to supply pilots with pertinent
weather information, particularly regarding conditions
more apparent to the controller than the pilot.1 32 Similarly,
a controller "cannot sit passively by and watch someone
commit a negligent act, or a grossly negligent act."
1 13
1" Id. at 1517.
127 Webb, 840 F. Supp. at 1512-13.
12 Id. at 1513 (citation omitted).
129 Id.
-50 Id. at 1514.
is, Cf Lombard v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 10, 13 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (FSS person-
nel need not take steps "of speculative value" to forestall pilot error).
132 Webb, 840 F. Supp. at 1517.




The court held that Specialist Walstad and other employ-
ees at Cedar City FSS breached a duty to Charlesworth by
failing to provide a sufficient outlook briefing the day
before the flight, failing to advise of alternative weather
sources when the computer was inoperative, and failing to
alert later briefers that Charlesworth had not received ade-
quate information. 134 However, these acts were not held to
have proximately caused the accident.13 5
Despite finding considerable negligence on the part of
various individuals involved in this tragedy, the court deter-
mined that Albuquerque represented a significant dividing
line with respect to which of these acts were proximate
causes. Applying the law of New Mexico, the court held that
reaching Albuquerque (a safe port), being delayed, and re-
suming the flight "constituted a new beginning, a major
break in the causal chain."136 Although the pilot and FSS
had committed negligent acts prior to the Albuquerque
landing, the negligence "had far spent itself and was too
small for the law's notice by the time the plane crashed
near Roswell."'3 7
The post-Albuquerque negligent acts held to constitute a
proximate cause of the crash were those of Charlesworth
FSS Specialist Byrom, and Roswell Controller Brown. 138
Charlesworth's negligence consisted of failing to avoid ad-
verse weather conditions of which he had actual or con-
structive notice.13 9 Specialist Byrom had negligently failed
to advise the pilot that VFR was not recommended and that
the potential for whiteout existed. 140 Controller Brown's
failure to advise of decreasing visibility and the possibility of
whiteout due to the lack of visual references from the air-
craft's approach position was also a legal cause of the acci-
" Id. at 1521.
15 Id.
" Id. at 1520-21.
"7 Id. at 1520.
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dent.14 Applying New Mexico's law of pure contributory
negligence, the court apportioned sixty percent of the lia-
bility to Charlesworth and forty percent to the federal gov-
ernment for the collective acts and omissions of Byrom and
Brown.1 42
In Worthington v. United States,14 3 a pilot and three passen-
gers were killed when their single engine aircraft crashed
into a wooded area near a Jacksonville airport on Novem-
ber 13, 1988. Although the weather had been clear
throughout most of the flight, fog enshrouded the destina-
tion airport at the time of the crash. The pilot had been
cleared for an IFR approach, but the plane crashed shortly
after reaching decision height.
Plaintiff argued that the air traffic controller had sup-
plied inaccurate weather data to the pilot, precipitating the
crash. After a non-jury trial, the district court entered judg-
ment for the defendant, holding that the pilot's negligence
was the sole cause of the accident. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed."4
The plaintiff theorized that Worthington, upon encoun-
tering unforecast weather conditions at decision height, ex-
perienced spatial disorientation, which caused the crash.
An expert listed five factors that he believed contributed to
the pilot's disorientation:
(1) inadequate weather information at the terminal check-
in;
(2) insufficient time to line up for an instrument approach
because of the delayed turnover from approach to local
control;
(3) inadequate weather information after clearance outside
the marker and before reaching decision height;
(4) the pilot's mistaken belief, based upon information re-
ceived from ATC, that he would encounter visual conditions
at decision height; and
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1521-22.
-4 21 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1994).
'-4 Id. at 399.
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(5) the increased workload upon approaching decision
height due to the late transfer. 14 5
In light of the parties' agreement that the pilot had ex-
perienced spatial disorientation, the Eleventh Circuit re-
jected the district court's finding to the contrary. 1 46 The
appellate court concluded that the pilot thought that he
would reach decision height in clear skies, based on the
controller's information, and that the lack of visual refer-
ences caused the disorientation.1 47 The court further con-
cluded that the pilot was most likely trying to execute a
missed approach at the time of the crash.' 48
Applying Florida's pure comparative negligence rule, the
circuit court concluded that the lower court had not appor-
tioned liability correctly. 49 The district judge had con-
cluded that the pilot's actions were an intervening cause,
breaking the causal connection between any controller neg-
ligence and the accident. The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the pilot's actions were precisely of the type
that controllers should foresee when inaccurate and un-
timely weather information is supplied in such time-critical
situations. 50 Although the pilot was not without fault, his
negligence should have been considered in apportioning
fault; it should not have acted to bar recovery.' 51 The case
was sent back to the district court for an apportionment of
liability and determination of damages.1 52
X. CONCLUSION
Determining the scope of governmental liability when in-
adequate weather information contributes to an aviation ac-
14 Id. at 402.
'- Id. at 403.
147 Id.
,41 Worthington, 21 F.3d at 403.
149 Id.
1 o Id. at 406.
im Id. at 407.
" Cf Martin v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1977) aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 586 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1978) (similar fact pattern resulting in judgment
against government); see supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
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cident requires a legally basic, yet factually complex,
determination of causation. Arising under the FTCA, this
determination of causation is left to the federal bench,
which is to apply the substantive law of the appropriate
state. Thus, even the most complex issues of proximate
cause, contributory fault, and superseding cause will be left
to an eminently qualified individual. 15 3
Unfortunately, whether the flaw is a hesitancy to expand
the scope of governmental liability or unfamiliarity with a
given state's tort law, the Budden cases demonstrate that this
system is far from foolproof. In light of the nearly universal
acceptance of comparative fault and the recognition that a
given accident may have several proximate causes, it is rea-
sonable to expect an increasing trend toward apportioning
liability against the government when FSS or ATC person-
nel are negligent in fulfilling their duty to supply pilots with
accurate and timely weather information. Webb and Worth-
ington are likely representative of this modern trend. An
increased viability of such claims against the government
will no doubt be welcomed by plaintiffs and co-defendants
alike.
'53 Not to mention the significant contribution of able-bodied clerksl
